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INTRODUCTION

Despite several bouts of attempted reinterpretation, the
presidential pardon power has generally been accepted as plenary
since the aftermath of the Civil War. Out of heated blows thrown
between Andrew Johnson and his Congress emerged a set of
Supreme Court cases opining that amnesty was part of pardoning
and suggesting that congressional attempts to control this
presidential capacity would violate the separation of powers. Like
many features of U.S. Constitutional law, this treatment of the
relationship between pardoning and amnesty and the allocation of
both to the President remains exceptional in relation to European
legal systems.1 Unlike a number of other divergences between
*

Leah Kaplan Visiting Professor in Human Rights, Stanford Law
School; Professor of Law and English, Cornell University School
of Law. I am grateful to participants in the Columbia Public Law
Workshop, the St. Louis Law School Faculty Workshop and the
Second Annual Originalism Conference at San Diego for feedback
on earlier drafts. This paper also benefited from the excellent
research assistance of Romain Zamour and Jessica Spencer.
1
Adam Liptak’s series of articles for the N.Y. Times in 2008 on the
subject of American exceptionalism indicated some of the areas in
which the U.S. diverges from other parts of the world, including
the exclusionary rule derived from the Fourth Amendment and the
adversarial selection of expert witnesses. Adam Liptak, U.S. Is
Alone in Rejecting All Evidence if Police Err, N.Y. TIMES (July 19,
2008); Adam Liptak, In U.S., Expert Witnesses Are Partisan, N.Y.
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U.S. and continental European constitutional law, however, the
discrepancy cannot be attributed primarily to differences between
the civil and common law systems.
At the time of the Founding, the common law of England
distinguished between pardoning in individual cases—still the
province of the King or Queen—and grants of amnesty or
oblivion—the domain of Parliament.2 This differentiation was not
solely derived from the dominance of legislative sovereignty
within the eighteenth century. Instead, it had arisen in the midseventeenth century, first suggested by the ill-fated King Charles I,
then implemented by the Interregnum Parliament, and, finally,
fully instated at the Restoration of King Charles II. Practice within
the American colonies displayed greater variations, ranging from
exalting the governor’s power of pardoning to passing acts of
oblivion through the legislature.3
As I have argued in Towards a Common Law Originalism,
an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation that aims to
be faithful to Founding Era history must not rely predominantly on
a simplified vision of the common law derived from Blackstone’s
Commentaries on the Laws of England.4
Rather, such
interpretation should examine the disparate strands of common
laws—some emanating from the colonies and others from
England, some more archaic and others more innovative—that
coexisted at the time of the founding. The resulting common law
originalist approach would treat eighteenth-century common law
not as providing determinate answers that fix the meaning of
particular constitutional clauses but instead as supplying the terms
of a debate about certain concepts. It would assist in framing
questions for judges or other constitutional interpreters in the
present, but often refuse to settle them definitively through resort
to history.
Were Article II to be interpreted from the vantage point of
the common laws in place when the Constitution was ratified, a
strong argument could be made that the President’s constitutional
power to pardon should not be construed to extend as far as
proclaiming amnesties. This very proposition raises the question,
however, of whether the Constitution’s structural provisions
partake of common law antecedents in the same manner as
TIMES (Aug. 12, 2008). For a discussion of the treatment of
pardon and amnesty in French and German law, see infra notes
146-151 and accompanying text.
2
See generally infra Section III.
3
See generally infra Section IV.
4
See generally Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law
Originalism, 51 STANFORD L. REV. 551 (2006).
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guarantees of rights. Even if the rights of the new American
citizen remained commensurate with those of the subject under the
common law, the arrangement of government arguably altered too
fundamentally in the shift from King to President and the change
from parliamentary supremacy to the separation of powers to
extrapolate common law constraints on executive power.
Several factors, however, suggest that this argument may
not be as persuasive as it initially appears. To a significant extent,
Article II’s grants of authority echo the capacities of the English
King.5 In addition, common law interpretation was itself applied
to assessing the scope of parliamentary power in various contexts.6
Furthermore, the fact that the legal structures of the colonies
experimented with diverse forms of political arrangement with
respect to the allocation of pardon powers indicates that common
law understandings of pardoning pertained not only to the King but
also to other forms of executive official. Finally, to the extent that
the claimed constitutional power of the President exceeds the
scope enjoyed by the King even in the seventeenth century, the
presumption that the move towards democracy in the American
Constitution should alter our understanding of the effect of the
common law backdrop cuts in the opposite direction. Indeed,
debates about oblivion in the English context often foreshadowed
what seem quite contemporary concerns in the United States about
the President immunizing executive branch officials for extra-legal
acts through the pardon power.7
Because the common laws were not univocal at the time of
the Founding with regard to the scope of pardoning and its political
location or locations, a common law originalist approach would
not insist that Congress alone should be construed as capable of
5

See FEDERALIST 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing the
analogies between the constitutional powers allocated to the
President and those exercised by the English King, but
simultaneously enumerating the substantial limitations on the
President’s deployment of those capacities).
6
For example, a late eighteenth-century treatise by Edward
Christian, Professor of Law at Cambridge, applied a common law
method to comprehend the scope of the power of Parliament.
According to Christian, “The usage and custom of Parliament
constitutes the Law of Parliament, which is part of the common
law of the land, or part of the Lex et Consuetudo Angliae.” AN
EXAMINATION OF PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES; FROM WHICH IT
APPEARS THAT AN IMPEACHMENT IS DETERMINED BY A
DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT: WITH AN APPENDIX, IN WHICH ALL
THE PRECEDENTS ARE COLLECTED 8 (2d ed., 1790).
7
See generally infra Section III.
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granting amnesty. Rather, an originalism attentive to the common
laws calls into question the inevitability of the determinations
about the pardon power reached by the Supreme Court following
the Civil War and indicates why these should be re-examined in
light of the indeterminacy of the historical record and the
normative considerations supporting congressional control over
amnesty. As these cases themselves indicate, some of the
entailments of amnesty—such as the restoration of those included
to full citizenship and the return of confiscated property—involve
powers like those of naturalization and spending that Article I
explicitly gives to Congress.8 To the extent that an offer of
amnesty precedes or amnesty is entailed by the cessation of
hostilities, the Senate’s capacity to advise and consent the
President on treaties may also be implicated. Nor should the
absence of an explicit congressional ability to issue amnesties in
the Constitution be considered determinative. Even the Supreme
Court has affirmed that Congress may possess a power concurrent
with the President to effect something like amnesty through the
Commerce Clause or other provisions of Article I.9 From the
common law originalist perspective, we should, therefore, keep our
eye on the history of oblivion rather than allowing it to be
overlooked or forgotten.
Remembering oblivion might also allow us to recover a
different form of pardoning, one associated with transitional justice
and the restoration of a community riven by civil strife.10 Today
we associate pardoning with the highly salient and potentially
corrupt instances of its application, such as the pardon of Marc
Rich.11 This vision stands in contrast to the history of pardoning,
replete with more routine and general mitigations of punishment as
well as the use of pardon as a political strategy.12 Simultaneously,
contemporary approaches to transitional justice, like the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, emphasize knowledge
8

See generally infra Section II.
See infra notes 153-154 and accompanying text.
10
For a recent defense of the ancient version of amnesty as an
alternative to contemporary practices of transitional justice, see
Adriaan Lanni, Transitional Justice in Ancient Athens: A Case
Study, 32 U. PENN. J. INT’L L. 551 (2010).
11
See Margaret Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, 100 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1169, 1195-1200 (2010) (analyzing the
last-minute pardons of the Clinton era and how they emanated not
only from presidential misjudgment but also from the Justice
Department’s
failure
to
produce
sufficient
pardon
recommendations).
12
See id. at 1172-93.
9
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as the prerequisite for personal forgiveness and political amnesty.13
Oblivion presents an alternative model for moving forward,
suggesting the possibility that certain kinds of conflicts would be
better forgotten than remembered for the continued health of the
polity.
Four components of oblivion emerge from an examination
of the English and American histories of the practice: its focus on
erasing instead of rehashing; its deployment after moments of civil
unrest, often connected with foreign conflict; its capacity to settle
widespread property disputes and restore the privileges and
immunities of citizenship; and its legislative character. Although
involving American actions abroad not at home, the most recent
example of a missed opportunity to appeal to oblivion involved
U.S. pressure on the Iraqi government not to grant amnesty to
Baathists in 2006.14 Domestically, the potential for conflict
between President and Congress over the capacity to issue amnesty
came to the fore in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. When
Congress held hearings in 1974 on the advisability of passing an
amnesty covering those currently imprisoned or effectively exiled
for evading the draft, the question of its ability to do so in light of
the President’s power of pardoning came to the fore and furnished
one of the reasons that it failed to implement an oblivion.15
Other more contemporary problems overlap at least in part
with situations that might earlier have called for oblivion. With the
expansion of the rhetoric of war into areas like the war on drugs,
and the resulting drastic sentences and sanctions imposed on
offenders, a partial amnesty in that area could effectuate some of
the purposes of oblivion by reintegrating a group of the
13

See Frank Haldemann, Another Kind of Justice: Transitional
Justice as Recognition, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 675 (2008)
(elaborating the dominant approach to transitional justice and
“constru[ing] transitional justice as a moral project of
recognition”).
14
Nathaniel Flick, Give Amnesty, but Not to All, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
10, 2006) (explaining that “[t]he Iraq Study Group report points to
a lack of national reconciliation as the ‘fundamental cause of
violence’ in Iraq” and that it “concludes that the Iraqi government
must find ‘ways and means to reconcile with former bitter
enemies’ and that ‘Iraqi amnesty proposals must not be undercut in
Washington’”).
15
H.R. Subcomm. on Cts., Civ. Liberties, & Administration of
Just. of the Comm. on Judi., H.R. 263, H.R. 674, H.R. 2167, H.R.
3100, H.R. 5195, H.R. 10979, H.R. 10980, H.R. 13001, H. Con.
Res. 144, and H. Con. Res. 385 Relating to Amnesty, 93d Cong.
(Mar. 8, 11, 13, 1974).
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disenfranchised into the political community. Likewise, calls for a
student loan amnesty—acknowledged to be within congressional
power, at least insofar as legislative action does not offend the
Takings Clause—recall the property settlement function of
oblivions.
In Section Two, the Article will examine the Supreme
Court’s treatment of pardoning in the aftermath of the Civil War.
Within the series of cases emerging from disputes between
Presidents Lincoln and Johnson and Congress during the latter half
of the nineteenth century, the Court both posited that amnesty and
pardoning were synonymous and that the power to accomplish
both rested in the hands of the President. At the same time, the
Court indicated that certain conventional entailments of amnesty
could only be effectuated by Congress, suggesting the problems
with its own assertion of the identity of pardoning and amnesty. In
order to uncover the nature of the difference between the two,
Section Three turns to the early modern English equivalent of
amnesty—oblivion. Arriving in England from Scotland and
international law, oblivion took hold in the seventeenth century
and became a significant parliamentary practice. Section Four then
demonstrates the existence of colonial versions of oblivion—
emerging almost simultaneous with the English forms—and
examines their legislative implementation and persistence through
the period of the American Revolution and the relations between
the states and the Continental Congress. Given the significant
Founding Era tradition of legislative oblivion even in states where
pardoning was a gubernatorial power, a strong argument can be
made from a common law originalist perspective for a
congressional ability to issue amnesty or oblivion. The final
Section evaluates the pragmatic considerations that might be taken
into account by the constitutional decision-makers—whether
Court, Congress, or President—assessing the prospects for issuing
legislative amnesties and presents various normative reasons for
increasing the role of Congress in this form of pardoning.
II

FROM KLEIN TO KNOTE

While Alexander Hamilton’s remarks at the time of the
Founding and the practice of some early presidents indicated that
at least advocates of a strong executive believed the President
could issue amnesties, the scope of the President’s pardon power
was most firmly established by a set of cases arising after the Civil
War. On December 8, 1863, hoping to provide an incentive to
hasten the end of hostilities, President Lincoln issued a
proclamation offering pardon and amnesty to any members of the
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Confederacy who would put down their arms and take an oath of
loyalty.16 Consistent in espousing broad executive authority,
Lincoln insisted on the same day in his annual address to Congress
that “the Constitution authorizes the Executive to grant or withhold
pardon at his own absolute discretion” and that “he has clear
constitutional power to withhold [pardon and restoration of
forfeited rights] altogether or grant [them] upon the terms which he
shall deem wisest for the public interest.”17
Although Lincoln had similarly maintained his ability to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus without the assistance of
Congress, the circumstances underlying his proclamation of
amnesty differed significantly. In July of 1862, Congress had
passed a statute authorizing the President “to extend to persons
who may have participated in the existing rebellion, in any State or
part thereof, pardon and amnesty, with such exceptions and at such
time and on such conditions as he may deem expedient for the
public welfare.”18 This law itself was fully within Lincoln’s own
cognizance when he issued the proclamation of pardon. Despite
the subsequent affirmation of his own exclusive power, Lincoln’s
actual proclamation cited not only the President’s constitutional
capacity “to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the
united States, except in cases of impeachment,” but also the fact
that “laws have been enacted by Congress . . . declaring that the
President was thereby authorized at any time thereafter by
proclamation to extend to persons who may have participated in
the existing rebellion, in any State or part thereof, pardon and
amnesty . . . .”19 Notwithstanding Lincoln’s efforts to assert
independent authority for his actions, Congress and the President
were operating in harmony in this instance.
But discord soon arose. With growing recognition of the
substantial financial toll that the Civil War had exacted from the
nation and the ascendance of a spirit of retribution rather than
reconciliation, members of Congress became increasingly resistant
16

For an excellent and detailed discussion of the history of this
period, from which the general statements about the relation
between Presidents Lincoln and Johnson and Congress are derived,
see generally Jonathan Dorris, Pardon and Amnesty under Lincoln
and Johnson (UNC Press, 1953).
17
Abraham Lincoln, Annual Message to Congress, Dec. 8, 1963,
in SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES: ABRAHAM LINCOLN 40709 (Gore Vidal ed., 1992).
18
13 Stat. at Large, 737.
19
Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconciliation,
Dec. 8, 1863, in SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES, supra note
17, at 411-412.
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to offers of amnesty, offers that often entailed restoration of the
forfeited property of former members of the Confederacy. As a
result, after the end of the war, and after Andrew Johnson had
replaced the assassinated Lincoln in office, Congress repealed its
authorization of presidential pardon and amnesty on January 21,
1867. Adopting Lincoln’s rhetoric and endowing it with even
more ferocity of purpose, Johnson continued to maintain his
exclusive capacity to decide on and implement amnesty in the face
of this Congressional disapproval. A series of judicial decisions on
the scope of the President’s pardon power ensued. Almost
uniformly, these affirmed an extremely expansive view of the
President’s ability under Article II “to Grant Reprieves and
Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in cases of
Impeachment.”20 More broadly, the Reconstruction cases, from
the 1865 decision in Ex parte Garland forwards, reinforced the
notion that the consequences of pardoning were vast, including not
only “restoring all civil rights” and “making [the one pardoned] a
new man,” but even “blot[ting] out of existence the guilt, so that,
in the eye of the law, the offender is as innocent as if he had never
committed the offence.”21
The broad language eloquently
employed in these opinions has furnished the basis for subsequent
understanding of the source and consequences of pardoning.
In Garland itself, Justice Field had already affirmed that
the pardoning “power of the President is not subject to legislative
control. Congress can neither limit the effect of his pardon nor
exclude from its exercise any class of offenders. The benign
prerogative of mercy reposed in him cannot be fettered by any
legislative restrictions.”22 Deploying the language of royal
sovereignty in his invocation of the prerogative of mercy, Field
simultaneously suggested that the President’s and the King’s
capacities might be commensurate and commensurately expansive.
It was not until the case of United States v. Klein, however,
resolved in 1871, that the Court was asked to confront the
consequences of Congress’s withdrawal of legislative permission
for presidential pardons. In Klein, Chief Justice Samuel Chase
used similarly expansive rhetoric in concluding that Congress’s
attempts to limit presidential amnesties were constitutionally
ineffectual and that Congress could not strip the Court of Claims
and the Supreme Court of jurisdiction over cases involving the
abandoned or captured property of presidentially pardoned
individuals. Notwithstanding the determination in Klein, however,
only six years later, in an opinion in United States v. Knote again
20

U.S. Const., art. 2.
Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380-81 (1866).
22
Id. at 380.

21
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penned by Justice Field, the Court held that, once assets had been
received into the treasury, even a presidential pardon could not
restore them to the individual in question absent congressional
approval.
The relationship between Klein and Knote has been the
subject of some debate. One scholar has recently contended that
looking from Klein to Knote and beyond fits within a general
pattern by which the Supreme Court moves from affirming the
exclusivity of the capacity of one branch in a particular area to the
concurrent powers of several branches in that domain.23 Another
has seen the discrepancy between the outcomes as simply tracking
the two different statutes under which the respective individuals’
property had been confiscated.24 Both arguments provide insight
into the connection between the decisions, yet both in a sense
overestimate the discrepancy between them. Close examination of
Klein reveals not only its strong statements about the separation of
powers, both between Congress and the judiciary and Congress
and the President, but also its almost excessive reliance on
Congress’s intent, particularly its intent in passing the initial statute
providing for the confiscation of property. From these passages
we can conclude that, had Congress’s intent been different—as it
was in the statute considered in Knote—Klein might not have been
permitted to recover his property, regardless of his jurisdictional
capacity to bring a claim. This circumstance is significant because
it suggests a sense even at the apex of assertions of the presidential
pardon power that certain entailments of amnesty or oblivion, like
the restoration of property that had already vested in the
government or a private party, might still lie outside scope of the
President’s authority.
The core of Klein entails invalidation of a jurisdictional
proviso on an appropriations bill that, in substance, rendered
“acceptance of a pardon, without disclaimer, [] conclusive
evidence of the acts pardoned, but [] null and void as evidence of
the rights conferred by it, both in the Court of Claims and in [the
Supreme Court].”25 According to the majority opinion, this section

23

Mark D. Rosen, “From Exclusivity to Concurrence,” 94 Minn. L.
Rev. 1051 (2010).
24
Jeffrey Crouch, The Presidential Pardon Power 46-48 (Kansas
UP, 2009).
25
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 144 (1871). For an
excellent recent account of the jurisdictional issues at stake in
Klein and their potential relevance today, see Amanda Tyler, “The
Story of Klein: The Scope of Congress’s Authority to Shape the
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts,” in Federal Courts Stories,
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of the law fell outside the scope of Congress’s ability under Article
III to carve exceptions in the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction.26 Although Congress possessed the authority to
“den[y] the right of appeal in a particular class of cases,” in this
instance it went as far as to impermissibly prescribe “a rule of
decision, in causes pending.”27 Furthermore, as Chief Justice
Chase added, “[t]he rule prescribed is also liable to just exception
as impairing the effect of a pardon, and thus infringing the
constitutional power of the Executive.”28
Around these lucid and seemingly definitive statements
about the limitations on Congress’s ability to restrict the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction and infringe on the President’s
pardon power lurk a number of other rather obscure comments
about Congress’s intent in passing the proviso. At the beginning of
the discussion of the relevant act, the opinion notes that, “Soon
afterwards the provision in question was introduced . . . and
became a part of the act, with perhaps little consideration in either
House of Congress.”29 Even more strangely, following discussion
of the constitutional infirmities of the law with respect to the
separation of powers, the majority concludes on the note of
statutory interpretation:
We repeat that it is impossible to believe that this
provision was not inserted in the appropriation bill
through inadvertence; and that we shall not best
fulfil the deliberate will of the legislature by
DENYING the motion to dismiss and AFFIRMING
the judgment of the Court of Claims; which is
ACCORDINGLY DONE.30
Entirely implausibly, the opinion thus claimed to be following the
true will of Congress—rather than its expressed purpose—instead
of simply invalidating the jurisdictional provision on constitutional
grounds.
Interpretation of another statute, however, furnishes a
crucial pre-condition for even reaching the jurisdictional question.
Indeed, the two dissenters, Justices Miller and Bradley, disagreed
Vicki Jackson and Judith Resnik eds. (NY: Foundation Press,
2010).
26
Id. at 146. See U.S. Const. art. III, sect. 2 (“In all the other cases
before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and
under such regulations as the Congress shall make.”).
27
Id. at 145-146.
28
Id. at 147.
29
Id. at 143 (italics added).
30
Id. at 148.
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with the majority not on the constitutionality of the proviso but
rather on the underlying issue of whether the Abandoned and
Captured Property Act of 1863 left any remaining interest in the
original property owner. According to Justice Miller, “I must
construe this act, as all others should be construed, by seeking the
intention of its framers, and the intention to restore the proceeds of
such property to the loyal citizen, and to transfer it absolutely to
the government in the case of those who had given active support
to the rebellion, is to me too apparent to be disregarded.”31
Because the intent of the statute was to deprive the owner of all
rights to the property at issue, and “the property [had] already been
seized and sold, and the proceeds paid into the treasury, . . . the
pardon does not and cannot restore that which has thus completely
passed away.”32 Although the outcome of Klein would seem to
suggest that the majority deemed otherwise, their determination
instead rested on a different understanding of Congress’s intent, an
understanding that itself relied on Congress’s initial act of
authorizing presidential pardons and amnesties.
In explaining the effect of the 1863 Act, Chief Justice
Chase, writing for the majority, by contrast emphasized that the
law was passed after the earlier 1862 statute—which also effected
confiscations—authorized the President to grant pardon and
amnesty.33 The implication of his analysis was that the existence
of the prior law indicated Congress’s intent to permit the President
to restore property to pardoned individuals even under the later
Abandoned and Captured Property Act. The subsequent repeal of
Congress’s authorization of pardon and amnesty under the 1862
law in 1867 could not affect the meaning of the Abandoned and
Captured Property Act, which had been enacted against the
backdrop of the repealed provisions. Hence, as the opinion
concluded, “it is impossible to believe, while the repealed
provision was in full force, and the faith of the legislature as well
as the Executive was engaged to the restoration of the rights of
property promised by the latter, that the proceeds of property of
persons pardoned, which had been paid into the treasury, were to
be withheld from them.”34
The following sentence confused matters, however, by
relying on the effects of a presidential pardon per se rather than
interpretation of the meaning of the Abandoned and Captured
Property Act. According to Chief Justice Chase, “The repeal of
the section in no respect changes the national obligation, for it does
31

Id. at 149 (Miller, J. dissenting).
Id. at 150 (Miller, J. dissenting).
33
Id. at 139.
34
Id. at 141-42.
32
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not alter at all the operation of the pardon, or reduce in any degree
the obligations of Congress under the Constitution to give full
effect to it, if necessary, by legislation.”35 It is this statement that
raises a potential conflict with United States v. Knote, where the
Court would support Congress’s independent ability to decide on
whether to dispense monies from the treasury, regardless of the
existence of a presidential pardon or amnesty. If Congress were,
indeed, obligated to give full effect to any pardon or amnesty, it
might be forced to pass legislation restoring property to pardoned
individuals. According to Knote, however, it is subject to no such
requirement.
The property at issue in Knote had been confiscated not
under the Abandoned and Captured Property Act but instead under
the 1862 confiscation act, the pardon and amnesty provisions of
which had been repealed.
While reiterating and even
supplementing the expansive representation of the President’s
pardon power provided in Klein, Knote nevertheless insisted that
the pardon does not “affect any rights which have vested in others
directly by the execution of the judgment for the offence, or which
have been acquired by others whilst that judgment was in force.”36
Hence, despite the vast scope of the President’s pardon, reaching
amnesty as well, “there is this limit to it, as there is to all his
powers,—it cannot touch moneys in the treasury of the United
States, except expressly authorized by act of Congress. The
Constitution places this restriction upon the pardoning power.”37
The congressional capacity to dispose of assets from the federal
fisc implied in the Court’s reasoning in Klein is explicitly brought
to the fore in Knote and forms the basis for the decision in the case.
Unlike the 1863 Act—the legislative intent of which the Court had
interpreted in light of the pardon and amnesty provisions already
passed in 1862—the 1862 Act itself had been divested of the
entailments of pardon through the later repeal and could not be
construed to permit restoration of forfeited property the value of
which had already been deposited in the treasury.
It is precisely in these cases, including Knote itself, that the
Court expressed its judgment that pardon and amnesty were the
same, a judgment that carries over to the present day. It is
precisely in these cases as well, however, that the Court’s
reasoning suggests why the full entailments of amnesty may
require legislative rather than simply presidential action. As Klein
maintained, both exalting the President’s capacity and insisting on
the erasing effects of the pardon, “To the executive alone is
35

Id. at 142.
Knote, 95 U.S. 149, 154.
37
Id. at 4.

36
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intrusted the power of pardon; and it is granted without limit.
Pardon includes amnesty. It blots out the offence pardoned and
removes all its penal consequences.”38 Citing these passages of
Klein, Knote went even further. As Justice Field observed:
Some distinction has been made, or attempted to be
made, between pardon and amnesty.
It is
sometimes said that the latter operates as an
extinction of the offence of which it is the object,
causing it to be forgotten, so far as the public
interests are concerned, whilst the former only
operates to remove the penalties of the offence.
This distinction is not, however, recognized in our
law. The Constitution does not use the word
‘amnesty;’ and, except that the term is generally
employed where pardon is extended to whole
classes or communities, instead of individuals, the
distinction between them is one rather of
philological interest than of legal importance. At all
events, nothing can be gained in the consideration
of the question before us by showing that there is
any difference in their operation.39
The extent of the effects of amnesty, however, and the fact that its
entailments might, as Knote observes, require congressional action
supports the possibility of a greater distinction that Field would
like to acknowledge. To understand the full meaning of the
“philological” difference and comprehend its potential implications
for American law we must, however, turn back to the debates of an
earlier moment in another country.
III

OBLIVION ENTERS ENGLAND

Within early modern England, “amnesty” was addressed
under the Latinate term of “oblivion.” As the second edition of
Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary glossed “amnesty,” it consisted in
“An act of oblivion; an act by which crimes against the
government, to a certain time, are so obliterated, that they can
never be brought into charge.” “Oblivion” itself he described
somewhat symmetrically as “Amnesty: general pardon of crimes in
a state.”40 The concept of oblivion appears to have arrived in
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Klein, 147-148.
Knote at 4.
40
The 1708 edition of Boyer’s Royal Dictionary likewise equated
the English “Act of Oblivion” with the French “amnistie.” See A.
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England with the Stuart Kings, brought with them from Scotland,
where an Act of Oblivion had been passed at least as early as the
sixteenth century. Although general pardons had proliferated in
England before, these remained somewhat distinct from oblivion in
context and effect.41 Whereas general pardons were, in an early
period, often proclaimed by the King, oblivion was legislatively
enacted.
Whereas general pardons occurred routinely on
coronation and other occasions, oblivion was deemed necessary in
the aftermath of rebellion or revolution. And whereas general
pardons forgave preceding crimes, oblivion wiped them out. In the
words of Bailey’s Universal Etymological Dictionary, it
“import[ed] that all Hostilities are at an End, passed by, and to be
buried in Oblivion.”42 As debates within the seventeenth century
reveal, and Johnson’s subsequent description confirms, oblivion
did, however, exist in close proximity to the general pardon.
Towards the end of the seventeenth century, the two could be seen
as intertwined, and the general pardon itself became more
legislative in nature.
In the heat of the Reformation, the 1560 Treaty of
Edinburgh—signed by France and England and establishing Queen
Elizabeth’s dominion over England and Ireland—granted an
oblivion for participation in hostilities in Scotland. As Queen
Elizabeth’s emissaries there informed her, the treaty provided that
“All things done here against the laws shall be discharged, and a
law of oblivion shall be established in this Parliament, excepting
only such as the Estates here shall judge unworthy of this
privilege.”43 Significantly, although the Scottish Lords agreed to
the treaty, Mary Queen of Scots assented neither at the time nor
subsequently. Of necessity, therefore, passage of oblivion rested
with the Scottish Parliament, and the task of specifying exceptions
also devolved to “the Estates.” Only after some importuning was
Queen Mary willing to assent to the Act itself, although she
ultimately allowed it to be extended to cover activities undertaken
through September 1, 1561. According to one account, “It was
with some difficulty that the queen was brought to consent to this
confirmation. She was afraid, that it might be considered as giving
Boyer, The Royal Dictionary: French and English and English and
French (London, 1708), definition of Act.
41
For a thorough treatment of the nature of the general pardon in
the sixteenth century, see Krista Kesselring, Mercy and Authority
in the Tudor State (Cambridge UP, 2003).
42
N. Bailey, An Universal Etymological English Dictionary
(London, 1724), definition of “amnesty.”
43
Haynes, State Papers (letter from William Cecil and Nicholas
Wotton to Queen Elizabeth, July 8, 1560).
Draft: Please Do Not Cite or Circulate Without Permission

14

a sanction to the treaty of Edinburgh, which she was firmly
resolved never to ratify; but upon the lords of parliament throwing
themselves on their knees at her feet, and urging, that it was the
only measure which could restore the public tranquillity, she gave
her consent.”44 Partly because of the context from which it arose,
this sixteenth-century Scottish act of oblivion thus already assumed
a legislative form.
It may not have been incidental that this oblivion was
impelled by a treaty. The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, frequently
credited with inaugurating the modern regime of nation states
enjoying territorial sovereignty, itself included a comprehensive
oblivion.45 Nor was this provision entirely an innovation—rather,
the concept and clauses of oblivion had been developed within
Renaissance treaties.46 There is some evidence that the Treaty of
Westphalia and other similar documents were influenced at least
indirectly by Roman law, including the Roman conception of

44

William Guthrie, A General History of Scotland, From the
Earliest Accounts to the Present Time, vol .6, at 216 (London,
1768).
45
See Treaty of Westphalia, art. II (“That there shall be on the one
side and the other a perpetual Oblivion, Amnesty, or Pardon of all
that has been committed since the beginning of these Troubles, in
what place, or what manner soever the Hostilitys have been
practise’d, in such a manner, that no body, under any pretext
whatsoever, shall practice any Acts of Hostility, entertain any
Enmity, or cause any Trouble to each other; neither as to Persons,
Effects or Securitys, neither of themselves or by others, neither
privately nor openly, neither directly nor indirectly, neither under
the colour of Right, nor by the way of Deed, either within or
without the extent of the Empire, notwithstanding all Covenants
made before to the contrary: That they shall not act, or permit to be
acted, any wrong or injury to any whatsoever; but that all that has
pass’d on the one side, and the other, as well before as during the
War, in Words, Writings, and Outrageous Actions, in Violences,
Hostilitys, Damages and Expences, without any respect to Persons
or Things, shall be entirely abolish’d in such a manner that all
might be demanded of, or pretended to, by each other on that
behalf, shall be bury’d in eternal Oblivion.”)
46
See Randall Lesafer, Conclusion, in Peace Treaties and
International Law in European History: From the Late Middle
Ages to World War I, at 404 (Randall Lesafer ed., 2004)
(“Important concepts and clauses such as amicitia, amnesty, and
oblivion and restitution were already fully developed in the treaties
of the Renaissance period”).
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restitutio.47
In the Westphalian context, this involved the
incorporation of a clause allowing for the restoration of previous
rights through a “general and unlimited amnesty.”48 Athens had
famously pioneered the device of amnesty in responding to the
reign of the Thirty Tyrants in 403 B.C.49 Although most Roman
memory sanctions involved punishing individuals by erasing them
from the public record, the possibility of a more political amnesty
that would allow for the reintegration of the polity was also raised
on several occasions.50 These ancient antecedents may have
infiltrated modern Europe through the terms of international peace
treaties.
With the Stuart succession to the English throne—first
through Mary’s son King James VI and I, and then via his own
offspring, the ill-fated King Charles I—advocates for acts of
oblivion arrived as well. Starting with the first Bishop’s War with
the Scots in 1639, King Charles I began to press such legislation.
Although the Scots agreed to cease their rebellion, when the
subject of the Act of Oblivion arose in Parliament, they resisted it,
and instead wished “to justifie themselves, and all their former
proceedings, and urge an act of Iustification to be recorded in
Parliament.”51 Following resumption of hostilities, the Scots
(joined by the English Parliament) did eventually accept—and
even solicit—another Act of Oblivion, one effect of which was to
prevent Charles I from even mentioning it when responding to
subsequent charges from Parliament.52
47

Laurens Winkel, The Peace Treaties of Westphalia as an
Instance of the Reception of Roman Law, in Peace Treaties and
International Law, supra note 46, at 222, 236.
48
Id.
49
For an illuminating and thorough defense of this amnesty and
the potential for applying a similar technique today, see Adriaan
Lanni, Transitional Justice in Ancient Athens, supra note 10.
50
See HARRIET I. FLOWER, THE ART OF FORGETTING: DISGRACE
AND OBLIVION IN ROMAN POLITICAL CULTURE 282-83 (2006) (“It
is striking to see the concept of amnesty, as developed by the
Athenians in 403 B.C. after the fall of the Thirty Tyrants, being
invoked by Cicero after the Ides of March in 44 B.C. and again by
the emperor Claudius in A.D. 41, when another Gaius Julius
Caesar had been assassinated.”).
51
WILLIAM SANDERSON, A COMPLEAT HISTORY OF THE LIFE AND
RAIGNE OF KING CHARLES FROM HIS CRADLE TO HIS GRAVE 254
(London: Humphrey Moseley, 1658).
52
Id. at 354. As Sanderson reported the King’s remarks in his
history of Charles I’s reign: “As for the Scots Troubles, these
unhappy Differences are wrapt up in perpetual silence by the Act
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A number of subsequent assays at and failures to achieve
Acts of Oblivion followed during the remainder of Charles I’s
reign, leading up to and through the beginnings of the English
Civil War. As a rule, the King would propose such an enactment,
and parliamentary forces would express opposition to pardoning
those who were in league with Charles himself or were already
under parliamentary investigation.53 The response that King
Charles framed to one iteration of this objection summarized his
general posture on the subject, which insisted both upon loyalty to
his adherents and oblivion as a means of achieving a more lasting
peace:
[T]his he [Charles I] well knoweth, That a general Act of
Oblivion is the best bond of Peace; and that after intestine
troubles, the wisdom of this and other Kingdoms hath
usually and happily in all Ages granted general Pardons,
of Oblivion passed in Parliaments of both Kingdoms, which stays
him from any further Reply to revive the memory of these evils.”
Sanderson, supra note 52, at 503.
53
Sanderson’s account demonstrates this dynamic. In 1644, King
Charles explained that, “for the total removing of all Fears and
Iealousies, his Majestie is willing to agree, that upon the
conclusion of Peace, there shall be a general Act of Oblivion and
free Pardon past by Act of Parliament in both his Kingdoms
respectively.” Id. at 857-58. Parliament then demanded in 1646
that certain people be excepted from the peace and from any Act of
Oblivion. Parliament insisted “[t]hat these persons shall expect no
pardon. In a word all the persons of Honour and Quality that have
taken up Arms for the King in England or Scotland, (which
because the Treaty took no effect is but frivolous to insert.) And
all such others as being processed by the Estates for Treason shall
be condemned before the Act of Oblivion be passed,” and,
furthermore, “[t]hat all Iudges, Officers, and Practicers of the Law,
that have deserted the Parliament, be incapable of Office or
Practice in the Law . . . .” Id. at 917.
Charles again suggested the possibility of an Act of
Oblivion in 1647, observing that “the Army (for the rest though
necessary, yet I suppose are not difficult to content) ought (in my
judgment) to enjoy the liberty of their consciences, have an Act of
Oblivion or Indempnity (which should extend to all the rest of my
Subjects) . . . .” Id. at 1018. In 1648, he likewise urged “That an
Act of Amnestie or Oblivion be passed, the very means of all
traverses which happened in the heat of War may be utterly
deleted. This Demand they liked not, but with cautely and
limitations, by the benefit whereof the Parliament might persecute
many of the Royallists.” Id. at 1096.
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whereby the numerous discontentments of Persons and
Families otherwise exposed to ruin, might not become fuel
to new disorders, or seeds to future troubles. His Majesty
therefore desires, that his two Houses of Parliament would
seriously descend into these considerations, and likewise
tenderly look upon his condition herein, and the perpetual
dishonour that must cleave to him, if he shall thus abandon
so many persons of Condition and Fortune that have
engaged themselves with and for him, out of a sense of
duty, and propounds as a very acceptable testimony of their
affection to him, that a general Act of Oblivion and free
Pardon be forthwith passed by Act of Parliament.54
Although the Interregnum Parliament would eventually, after some
delay, take this politic advice, and pass a general pardon of its
own, Charles’ plea, when made, fell upon deaf ears, and he never
received the advantage of such an act.55
The successive rejections of Charles’ offers of and requests
for oblivion did not, however, cause him to abandon belief in the
power of pardoning, even beyond his own death. In his final letter
to his already exiled son, Charles instructed the latter to follow his
own course in preferring clemency and oblivion to revenge, both
for religious and political reasons.56 In exalting the power of
pardoning to his son, Charles I wrote with more effect than in his
entreaties to Parliament.
At the time of the Restoration, Charles II had already
indicated several times his preference for pardoning over
punishment. In his 1651 Declaration to All His Loving Subjects of
the Kingdome of England and Dominion of Wales, issued from his
camp at Woodhouse, Charles explained that he wished “to
evidence how fare we are from Revenge” by “Declar[ing] and
Engag[ing] Our Selfe to give Our Consent to a full Act of Oblivion
and Indempnity for the security of all Our Subjects of England, and
Dominion of Wales, in their Persons, Freedomes, and Estates, for
all things done by them relating to these Wars these seven yeeres
past, and that they shall never be called in question by Us for any
of them,” excepting only Cromwell, and some others “who did
Actually sit, and Vote in the Murther of Our Royall Father.”
Charles had, likewise, promised passage of an Act of Oblivion to
54

Id. at 983-84.
The Parliamentary pardon is discussed in The Cavaliers Jubilee:
Or, Long look’d for come at last: viz. The Generall Pardon (1652).
The subtitle, “Long look’d for come at last,” indicates even the
Interregnum Parliament’s reluctance to pass a general pardon and
the resultant delay.
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his British subjects when seeking restoration, and subsequently
opined to Parliament that, in the absence of this promise, “neither I
nor You had been now here.”57
Although Charles’ Declaration of Breda had assured his
restored subjects of his inclination towards pardoning, some delay
intervened between this speech and Parliament’s action on the
subject.58 Indeed, conflict broke out almost immediately during
the parliamentary deliberations; one member had injudiciously
claimed that those who first began the Civil War were as guilty as
those who had ultimately executed Charles I, a statement that drew
great resistance and would have led to punishment had the
Parliament not been simultaneously considering mercy, pardon,
and indemnity.59 The time that lapsed between the Declaration of
Breda and Parliament’s passage of the Act of Oblivion was
construed by some as indicating the King’s retraction of his
promises; as a result, and in response to these criticisms, Charles
renewed his pleas to Parliament in favor of the Act.60 As a
member of the House subsequently recollected, passage of the
oblivion ultimately occurred in haste and with a perception of
necessity.61
The language of the Act as well as Charles’ speech
accompanying it suggested two central purposes—to avoid the
possibility of continued struggle based on the revolutionaries’
assumption that they remained in danger, and, counterintuitively,
to enable harsher punishment of future treasonous activity.62 In
service of the former goal, the Act announced the King’s desire “to
bury all seeds of future Discords and remembrance of the former,
as well in his own Breast as in the Breasts of his subjects one
towards the other.”63 Even the memory of the discords, not simply
their consequences in punishment, would be eliminated; oblivion
was not simply a velleity, but actually enforced by the Act.
Anyone who, within three years of its passage, “presume[d]
57

His Majesties Gracious Speech to the House of Peers, the 27th of
July, 1660, Concerning the Speedy Passing of the Bill of
Indempnity and Oblivion at 4.
58
HISTORY AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 4-5.
59
Id. at 13-14.
60
Id. at 15-16.
61
Hence in 1672, Waller claimed during debate that “sometimes
we were in such great haste, that the Act of Oblivion, in its
confirmation, was not read at all . . . —Are not necessity and speed
acknowledged by the House?” DEBATES IN PARLIAMENT IN 1672,
DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 112-13.
62
Act of Oblivion.
63
Id.
Draft: Please Do Not Cite or Circulate Without Permission

19

maliciously to call or alleadge of or object against any other person
or persons, any Name or Names, or other Words of Reproach, any
way tending to revive the Memory of the late Differences, or the
Occasions thereof,” would be forced to pay the aggrieved
individual a fairly significant fine.64 As the controversy leading up
to passing the Act had demonstrated, even discussing the
revolutionary sequence of events could stir turmoil and lead to
reputational harms that could spur continued violence.
At the same time, however, Charles insisted that his
character for mercy would not lead him into a permissive reign.
The oblivion specified in the Act covered a precise time period—
from January 1, 1637 to June 4, 1660—and Charles accorded
considerable significance to this delineation. As he announced,
subdividing time into that included within the purview of the
statute, that between the time designated and that in which he
spoke, and all future time, “all I do very willingly pardon . . . that
are pardon’d by this Act of Indemnity, to that Time which is
mention’d in the Bill: Nay, I will tell you, That, from that Time to
this Day, I will not use great Severity, except in such Cases where
the Malice is notorious, and the Public Peace exceedingly
concern’d. But for the Time to come, the same Discretion and
Conscience, which dispos’d me to the Clemency I have express’ed
(which is most agreeable to my Nature) will oblige me to all
Rigour and Severity, how contrary soever it be to my Nature,
towards those who shall not now acquiesce, but continue to
manifest their Sedition and Dislike of the Government, either in
Actions or Words.”65 The same equitable characteristics of
discretion and conscience that led Charles to seek out an Act of
Oblivion thus become the justification for enhancing the severity
of punishment for the future.
The terms in which the Act was drafted also demonstrated
some anxiety about the generality of its scope. In its attempt to
cover all contingencies, the Act of Oblivion included various
catalogues of the circumstances it intended to comprehend. The
Act thus enumerated all of the categories of activities it would
cover, and insisted that it should be read as if it resembled a
traditional pardon for very specific offenses: the “said Free Pardon,
Indempnity and Oblivion, shall be as good and effectual in the Law
to every of his said subjects, Bodies corporate, and others before
rehearsed, in, for, and against all things which be not hereafter in
this present Act excepted and foreprized, as the same pardon,
Indempnity, and Oblivion should have been, if all Offices,
Contempt, Forfeitures, Causes, Matters, Suits, Quarrels, Judgments
64
65

Id. 1257.
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Executions, penalties, and all other things, not hereafter in this
present Act excepted and foreprized, had been particularly,
singularly, especially and plainly named, rehearsed and specified,
and also pardoned by proper and expresse Words and Names . . .
.”66 The Act likewise provided for its own use as a defense by the
“singular” subject in a particular court case despite its “general
Words, Clauses, and Sentences.”67
The 1652 Act of General Pardon and Oblivion passed
under Oliver Cromwell had also taken pains to explain that it
should be considered as effective in each instance as an individual
pardon would have been.68 It contained another provision,
however, that suggested the linkage between oblivion and the
restoration of property, a connection that has characterized a
variety of subsequent amnesties and oblivions as well. As the
statute recited, employing as many synonyms as possible to fully
convey its point,
And the said Keepers of the Liberty of England by the
Authority of this present Parliament, Granteth and freely
giveth, Acquitteth, Pardoneth, Releaseth and Dischargeth to
every of the persons, and to every of the said Bodies
Corporate and others before rehearsed, and every of them,
all Goods, Debts, Chattels, Fines, Issues, Profits,
Amerciaments, Forfeitures, which to the said Keepers of
the Liberty of England do or shall belong or appertain by
reason of any Offence, Contempt, Trespass, Entry,
Misdemeanor, Matter, Cause, Sequestration or Quarrel,
had, suffered, done or committed by them or any of them
before the said third day of September, and which be not
hereafter in this Act foreprized and excepted.69
The language of this release of confiscated goods and return of
resources suggests the importance of the provision and the efforts
taken to ensure it not be misconstrued. The danger of incorrect
interpretation was itself the target of the following clause, which
mandated that the Act “be taken in all Courts . . . most beneficial to

66

Act of Oblivion.
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“This free pardon as effectual as if all Offences had been
particularly named,” in “An Act of General Pardon and Oblivion”
(Feb. 24, 1651/2), ACTS AND ORDINANCES OF THE INTERREGNUM,
1642-1660 (1911), at 565-577. For a discussion of Cromwell’s
support for this measure, see ANTONIA FRASER, CROMWELL 399
(1973).
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Id.
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all and singular the Persons, Bodies Corporate, and others before
rehearsed . . . without any ambiguity, question or other delay.”70
Notwithstanding these Acts’ elaborate injunctions to forget,
many insisted that the oblivions themselves should be remembered
and argued about precisely what such recollection should entail. A
satirical poem penned by Patrick Carey, presumably during the
period of the Protectorate, after the dissolution of the Rump
Parliament in 1653, took aim against the factions of the Barebones
Parliament that appeared to have forgotten the oblivion. Urging
Cromwell to consider his promise of oblivion and forgiveness of
debts as itself a debt, Carey wrote:
The Parliament, ’tis said, resolve
That, some time e’er they were dissolved,
They’d pardon each Delinquent,
And that (all past scores to forget)
Good store of Lethe they did get,
And round about that drink went.
The Country for its faith was praised;
No more the Great Tax should be raised,
Arrears should all be quitted:
Our everlasting Parliament
Would now give up its government;
A new mould should be fitted.
Th’Act of Oblivion’s laid aside,
Sects multiply, and subdivide,
’Gainst which no order’s taken;
And for th’ new Representative,
Faith (for my part) I’d e’en as lieve
The thought on’t were forsaken.
.

.

.

Cromwell! A promise is a debt,
Thou mad’st them say, they would forget;
O make them now remember!
If they their privileges urge:
Once more the house of office purge,
And scour out every member.71
This was neither an isolated instance of recrimination nor a charge
leveled only against the government of the Interregnum period.
70

Id.
[PATRICK CAREY,] POEMS FROM A MANUSCRIPT, WRITTEN IN THE
TIME OF OLIVER CROMWELL 34 (1771).

71

Draft: Please Do Not Cite or Circulate Without Permission

22

What it might mean to remember oblivion—and how extensive
forgetting should be remained a live question for a number of
years.
More than half a century later, another writer raised the
possibility that commemorating the date of the execution of King
Charles I undermined the Act of Oblivion. As he opined, “the Law
which enjoins the Observation of this Day, is inconsistent with,
and directly repugnant to the Act of Oblivion.”72 Pointing out the
paradox of issuing sermons from the pulpit about culpability for
Charles’ death while ordinary subjects were barred from
mentioning the conflicts, the anonymous pamphleteer voiced the
view that, “Were it not for the reviving the Memory of Things on
this Day, to which the Clergy are obligated, . . . the greatest Part of
the Populace, whose Mouths are shut by the Act of Oblivion, tho’
in vain, whilst the Priest’s is open, wou’d by this Time, after so
many Years, have been in a great Measure, if not altogether as
ignorant, that any such Thing had been transacted on the Stage of
England, as they are of the Act of Oblivion.”73 Like Carey before
him, this author advocated remembering the oblivion in order to
forget other grievances that would re-open old wounds and spawn
new strife.
Parliamentary discussion of the scope of the oblivion and
the extent to which either new legislation or action taken against
the King’s ministers might violate the Act revealed the legislative
conception of the statute. Both supporters and opponents of King
Charles II invoked the Act of Oblivion as setting a standard
incompatible with subsequent legislative proposals. In “A Letter
from a Person of Quality to his Friend in the Country,” often
attributed to Anthony Ashley Cooper, first Earl of Shaftesbury, the
author contended that the proposed “Act to prevent the dangers
which may arise from persons disaffected to the government”
implicitly contradicted the Act of Oblivion and, by “reviving of
former miscarriages,” would “put[ a] vast [] number of the king’s
subjects in utter despair of having their crimes ever forgotten.”74
While the suggestion here was that Parliament and the King should
remain cognizant of their former promises, represented by the
legislation they passed, debates within the House of Commons
indicated that there might be legal ramifications if, in the absence
of a further statute passed by Parliament, the King took steps
inconsistent with the Act of Oblivion.
72
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Id. at 15.
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Contention over this issue came to a head during extensive
debates about a series of addresses to the King advocating the
removal of the Duke of Lauderdale, one of his ministers. At stake
was the question of whether Charles himself could remove
Lauderdale without violating the Act of Oblivion, a point that the
King himself cleverly inserted into the discussion through his
response to the first such address. In answering the House of
Commons, the King invoked the specter of the Act of Oblivion and
his horror of making incursions into its effects:
As to [Lauderdale’s words], his Majesty perceived,
that, if they had been spoken, they must have been spoken
before the last Act of general pardon; and his Majesty,
being sensible how great a satisfaction and security the
inviolable preservation of the former Act of indemnity and
oblivion has been to all his subjects, cannot but apprehend
the dangerous consequences of enquiring into any thing
that has been pardoned by an Act of general pardon, lest the
example of that might give men cause to fear their security
under the first Act of Oblivion.75
Strategically referring to the precedent of the oblivion, Charles
suggested that undermining a subsequent legislative pardon would
open the earlier law to incursions as well. By associating the Act
of General Pardon with the Act of Oblivion, Charles thereby asked
the House to view the former as more akin to the latter than to the
King’s independent use of his prerogative to pardon.
The reaction that this statement anticipated might have
been that of Sir Edward Dering, who, during the subsequent
debate, maintained the equality of Parliament’s several laws and
insisted on the similarity of the effects of pardon and oblivion:
There is no distinction between an Act of Grace and
Oblivion, in West-minster-Hall, and he hopes you will
make none here—He hears not a lawyer speak in it. If an
officer, or a deputy-lieutenant, be pardoned, as is said, for
an offence, by Act of Parliament, surely no farther notice is
taken of it. As to that alleged ‘of the Act of Corporations,
and the Assent and Consent in the Act of Uniformity, to be
breaches made in the Act of Indemnity;’ they are by Act of
Parliament, which only can void another Act.76
Under this account, it would entail an exercise of prerogative that
could violate Parliament’s earlier legislative statement for the King
75
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to remove the Duke of Lauderdale. Only a properly passed
statute—not simply an address by the House—could furnish
sufficient legal grounds for overturning the Act of Oblivion, and,
by extrapolation, other acts of general pardon. Another member,
Sir Joseph Tredenham, expressed a similar sentiment, maintaining
that, “Should the Duke of Lauderdale be banished, on this
Address, the late Act of Pardon would be violated, or at least
suspended. Should it be violated, the King may justly say, he has
gone by measures we have given him.”77 Likewise, Sir John Ernly
remarked that, “If the Duke must answer aginst a public Act, and
we have the benefit of a public Act, ’tis Strange.”78 Even more
definitively, Sir Henry Ford proclaimed that he “Believes that the
King might have answered categorically, as well as hypothetically,
if he had pleased, to your Address. . . . ’Tis for your sake the King
removes [Lauderdale] not; and if not for yours, for the so many
hundreds we represent. He violates not the Pardon.”79
Not all members of the House were, however, convinced
by the King’s answer, and some endeavored to draw lines between
oblivion and pardon. One compared the King’s privilege of
pardoning with his capacity to remove individuals from office and
distinguished between the effects of an Act of General Pardon and
an Act of Oblivion. As Sir Thomas Lee insisted, the House could
continue to pursue Lauderdale without undermining the Act of
Pardon: “That the Commons should shake the Act of Pardon, we
are most studiously to clear. The comparison must lie betwixt an
oblivion, and pardon of crimes, for safety, named especially. Will
any man tell you, that the King, having power to pardon, by Grace,
has not power to remove a servant, or his very Privy Council?”80
Others supported distinguishing between the effects of an Act of
Oblivion and a general pardon. Colonel Birch thus advocated a
further “Address to the King, with hearty thanks for the Act of
Grace; but would have some difference made between that and an
Act of Oblivion. . . . He means fairly, would have hearty thanks
returned the King for his gracious pardon, and would distinguish
between an Act of Grace and Oblivion.”81 Ultimately, the House
decided to renew their plea to the King and address him another
time on the subject of Lauderdale.
These debates suggest a parliamentary conception of
oblivion—and, in some cases, of general pardons as well. A
number of subsequent general pardons were legislatively passed,
77
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as well as a further Act of Oblivion under William III.82 Exegesis
of the meaning of oblivion during the seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries indicated, however, that granting oblivion
might entail a more radical forgetting of the events of the past than
a general pardon, a forgetting that might even be incompatible with
holidays memorializing aspects of a struggle. This forgetting
could only be accomplished by Parliament itself, with the consent
of the nation as well as of the King. Such forgetting was also
accompanied in some instances by the restoration of forfeited
property or immunization of the King’s ministers, aspects of
oblivion that would augur later features of amnesty.
This is not to suggest though that there were no advocates
of the King’s independent power to pardon, or that no one
supported a royal grant of oblivion. One treatise adopting an
internationalist approach to the subject following a general pardon
under King George III insisted—despite including a number of
statutory pardons in the Appendix—that mercy was the peculiar
province of the English King. As the author of The History of the
Clemency of our English Monarchs wrote, “Surely the Reader in
the end, will be convinc’d, that Oblivion was the peculiar
Characteristick of our Antient English Monarchs, tho’ they had to
deal with stubborn and undutiful Children.”83 Reasoning from the
laws of war and the law of nature as well as domestic precedent,
the work insisted that the cessation of struggle should be
82

At the end of 1689, in response to pro-Jacobite rebellion in
Ireland, King William “was pleas’d to recommend [to Parliament]
the Passing of an Act of Oblivion, that his Subjects might see, he
had no other Intentions, but to govern by Law, and to leave them
without Excuse, that should attempt to disturb the Government in
his Absence.” 2 LIFE AND REIGN OF KING WILLIAM III 356. The
Parliament agreed. Id. at 357.
Several acts of general pardon were passed under Queen
Anne and then King George III that echoed the language of the
earlier acts of oblivion indicating that the pardon, although
comprehensive in terms, would be as potent in effect as a series of
more specific individual pardons. See “An Act for the Queens
most Gracious, General, and Free Pardon, Anno Regni Annae
Reginae Septimo, at the Parliament Summoned to be Held at
Westminster, the Eighth Day of July, Anno Dom. 1708” (1709);
“An Act for the Kings most Gracious, General, and Free Pardon,
Anno Regni Georgii Regis Tertio, at the Parliament Begun and
Holden at Westminster, the Seventeenth Day of March, Anno Dom.
1714” (1717).
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M.E., THE HISTORY OF THE CLEMENCY OF OUR ENGLISH
MONARCHS 15 (1717).
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accompanied by oblivion whether the conflict was of an
international or domestic nature. According to M.E., the author of
the treatise, it is a “Maxim, that no more Blood ought to be shed in
any War, than answers the End for which Arms were first assum’d.
This therefore holds good in Civil as in Foreign Wars, because the
Utility, Convenience and Justice is equal in both at least, if the
Scale does not turn on the Side of the Subject; because I look upon
the Blood of such an one to be more previous than that of a more
foreign Enemy.”84 Because the King serves as the sovereign
representative in the international arena and can agree to treaties of
peace, he should, by extrapolation, be able to undertake oblivions
in the domestic sphere. Approaching the pardon power from the
internationalist vantage point thus led the writer of this history of
clemency to view the King’s capacity with respect to foreign
conflicts as indicating the extent of his pardoning power arising out
of civil struggle.
This analysis in a sense short-circuited the development of
oblivions within Scottish and then English law. Although akin to
and perhaps ultimately derived from the terms of international
peace treaties, domestic acts of oblivion came to assume a
distinctly parliamentary form. As the legislative debates about the
appropriate means for honoring an oblivion demonstrated, the
capacity to pass oblivions was, by the end of the seventeenth
century, generally deemed a parliamentary power. Oblivion itself,
while resembling other forms of pardon in certain respects,
possessed a distinct ability to erase the acts it covered and to
restore the possession of confiscated or disputed property. The
question of how to remember an act of oblivion while forgetting
the events it purported to erase remained, however, something of a
puzzle.
IV

COLONIAL AND STATE OBLIVIONS

Pardoning practices diverged considerably within the
American colonies, frequently varying with the political
organization of the particular jurisdiction. Whereas the royal
affiliation of the Carolinas promoted a strong vision of the
executive pardon, colonies like Connecticut and Rhode Island
instead allocated pardoning to the legislature.85 Nor did the
84
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For a survey of the formal provisions for pardoning within the
colonial charters and constitutions, see William Duker, The
President’s Power to Pardon: A Constitutional History, 18 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 475, 497-501 (1977).
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structure of pardoning necessarily remain stable during the course
of colonies’ history; the advent of royal charters or changes in
political organization were often accompanied by alterations in the
mechanisms for pardoning.86 Yet in the vast majority of cases, the
charters or constitutions of the colonies indicated at least the
formal presumption of an executive pardon.87 As often happens,
however, the law on the books was not entirely consistent with the
law in action. Even some of the colonies that explicitly designated
pardoning the prerogative of the governor, like Maryland, enacted
oblivions legislatively beginning as early as the mid-seventeenth
century.
The actual practice of a number of colonies echoed that of
England, distinguishing between pardon and oblivion and
differentiating between the power to issue one or the other. The
timing of the earliest American oblivion—preceding the English
statute of 1652 by several years—suggests that the colonies did not
simply receive the distinction fully constituted from the English
context. The practice of oblivion, which came to England itself
from the margins of its empire and from European traditions,
developed distinct contours within the colonial setting, despite
being shaped to some degree by the English experience. Although
the English entailments of oblivion find parallels within the
colonies, the latter were, if anything, more intent on promoting the
process of forgetting, adding corporal and shaming punishments to
the fines that the English had prescribed for bringing up events that
should be dismissed from memory. As a number of historians of
the Atlantic world have recently demonstrated, simply positing an
English tradition received in America considerably oversimplifies
the dynamic process of interchange not only between England and
its colonies but also more broadly throughout the Atlantic. A wide
range of methods have been employed for examining Atlantic
history, but common emphases on circulation around the outskirts
of the ocean, drawing international comparisons, and situating
national history within a larger Atlantic frame have emerged.88
86

Under the “Body of Liberties” in Massachusetts, for example,
the General Court was empowered to pardon, and executive
officers could only reprieve a sentence for the period before that
body met. With the Charter of 1691, however, pardoning passed
back to the royally appointed governor. See id. at 497-98.
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See id.
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For a typology of modes of Atlantic history that discusses these
aspects, see David Armitage, Three Concepts of Atlantic History,
in THE BRITISH ATLANTIC WORLD, 1500-1800 (David Armitage
and Michael J. Braddick eds., 2d ed. 2009), at 11-30, 15 (“1.
Circum-Atlantic history—the transnational history of the Atlantic
Draft: Please Do Not Cite or Circulate Without Permission

28

These approaches carry implications for constitutional scholarship,
which has often remained content with diagnosing the English
origins of American principles without acknowledging the fluid
interactions between colony and empire and the infiltration of
some not quite Anglo-Saxon conventions. The flourishing of
oblivion in America during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries furnishes one example of experimentation across the
Atlantic with a practice that was almost as new in England as in
the colonies.
Colonial legislatures’ ability to issue acts of oblivion
continued through the period leading up to the American
Revolution, and the new states deployed this capacity quite
extensively, often at the behest of the federal government.
Following the Revolution, the Continental Congress—capable only
of suggesting laws to the states rather than enacting national
policy—recommended the passage of acts of oblivion to state
legislatures, recommendations that were followed in a number of
jurisdictions.89 As examination of legislative journals and debates
of both the local and federal variety indicates, the nominal place of
pardoning within the state did not entirely dictate the form an
oblivion would assume. It was not until the Whiskey Rebellion of
1794 that oblivion, in the new guise of amnesty, was offered
unilaterally by President Washington during the congressional
recess. Even then, Pennsylvania’s parallel proffer was still termed
an “act of oblivion,” although in substance it had lost its legislative
connection. The response to the Whiskey Rebellion hence marked
the end of oblivion’s ascendancy. Although Washington’s early
interpretation of the scope of the president’s constitutional power
to pardon has been taken by some scholars as indicating that
Article II was intended to include amnesty, the history of oblivion
through the post-Revolutionary period leading up to ratification
demonstrates that it was frequently thought of as a legislative act.

world. 2. Trans-Atlantic history—the international history of the
Atlantic world. 3. Cis-Atlantic history—national or regional
history within an Atlantic context.”).
89
State experimentation with the forms of pardoning did not, of
course, end with ratification of the Constitution. As John Dinan
has demonstrated, states have offered a number of structural
responses to perceived executive abuses of the pardon power
during the course of their constitutional histories. See John Dinan,
The Pardon Power and the American State Constitutional
Tradition, 35 POLITY 389-418 (April 2003).
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One of the earliest examples of a colonial oblivion occurred
in 1650, in the aftermath of civil tumult in Maryland.90 Under the
royal charter of 1632, Lord Baltimore enjoyed the ability “to
Remit, Release, Pardon, and Abolish, all Crimes and Offences
whatsoever against such Laws, whether before, or after Judgment
passed.”91 On various occasions, the Lord Proprietor himself or
his deputed governor accordingly granted pardons. Some years
after suspension of the sentence of a man who had slaughtered a
cow that did not belong to him, Pope Alvey, the legislature
petitioned the Governor to pardon Alvey, and the request was
honored.92 In other instances, the Proprietor Cecil Calvert used his
pardon power—or instructed the Governor to employ it on his
behalf—to remit punishment in cases of excusable homicide.93
Pardoning could thus be performed by the colony’s executive
authorities. Despite this circumstance, the Assembly joined
together with the Lord Proprietor in enacting the 1650 oblivion.
The events giving rise to the need for oblivion had occurred
some years earlier, in 1645 and 1646.94 Founded in 1634 by Cecil
Calvert, the Second Lord Baltimore, Maryland was unusual among
the colonies in having a Catholic proprietor, whose brother,
Leonard Calvert, was serving as governor. From nearly the
beginning, religious and political tensions beset Maryland.
Protestant inhabitants were chary about the Catholic leadership and
not uninfluenced by the fiercely anti-Catholic rhetoric circulating
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See An Act of Oblivion. Lib. C and WH. fol. 115. Lib. WH. fol.
135. and Lib. WH and L. fol. 6, in Bacon’s Laws of Maryland,
chap. XXIV, vol. 75, p. 37; see also An Act of Oblivion, April
1650, Proceedings and Acts of the General Assembly, Jan. 1637/8September 1664, vol. 1, p. 301.
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Maryland Charter of 1632, art. vii.
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For a discussion of this pardon, see RAPHAEL SEMMES, CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT IN EARLY MARYLAND 29 (1996) (1938). The
petition and Governor’s response can be found in 2 ARCHIVES OF
MARYLAND 370, 377 (Assembly Proceedings) (1674).
93
See Semmes, supra note 92, at 134-36; 51 ARCHIVES OF
MARYLAND 346-48; 10 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND 141-44
(explaining that the “ffine” a jury imposed on someone who had
accidentally killed a man “was afterwards remitted by the
Governor upon the Lord Propriary’s Spl direccon”).
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For a comprehensive account of the underlying events and the
religious, political, and economic factors contributing to them, see
generally TIMONTHY B. RIORDAN, THE PLUNDERING TIME:
MARYLAND AND THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR, 1645-1646 (2004).
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in England on the eve of the English Civil War.95 They were
simultaneously concerned with protecting their political capacities
in Maryland; the Assembly rejected the first set of laws sent over
from England by Lord Baltimore partly on the grounds that they
should be able to generate their own and proceeded to argue
strenuously though unsuccessfully for a lower house veto on all
laws and their right to pass legislation that would last for three
years.96 It was against the backdrop of these religious and political
tensions that English privateer Richard Ingle’s takeover of the
government occurred.
Ingle himself had been trading in Maryland and Virginia in
1642. A fervent supporter of Parliament over the King, he refused
arrest in the name of King Charles for his role in an altercation on
board his ship; as he stated, “If you had arrested mee in the King
and Parliaments name I would have obeyed it for soe it is now.”97
He was later accused of treason for his statements promoting
Parliament’s authority and disparaging the King, and, although the
first case against him ended with the inconclusive verdict of
“Ignoramus,” those opposing Ingle continued to pursue various
judicial strategies against him. In the meantime, Ingle had
received a letter of marque under a December 1643 act of
Parliament, which “authoriz[ed] the seizure of vessels trading to
95

Id. at 87 (“[I]ssues that would soon drag Maryland into the fray
[of the Civil War] and nearly destroy the colony were apparent.
As always, religion was foremost. The conflict between king and
Parliament was primarily over constitutional issues, but it had
more than a hint of religious dispute as well. Even though this
conflict was between two Protestant factions, English Catholics
could not avoid becoming a part of it. Father Thomas Hughes
noted that while England divided itself between Royalists and
Parliamentarians, both parties were openly anti-Catholic.”).
96
See id. at 25-26 (“In the first Assembly for which we have a
record, [Thomas] Cornwaleys was one of the leaders who opposed
the code of laws sent over by Lord Baltimore, asserting the right of
freemen to initiate the legislation that affected their lives.”); 37
(“When the [1642] session began, Robert Vaughn of Kent Island
offered a motion in the name of all the burgesses that the Assembly
be divided into uppoer and lower houses and that the lower house
have the right to veto all legislation they did not like. Governor
Calvert, aware that this would limit his ability to control the
Assembly, and having no authority from Lord Baltimore to allow
it, denied the request.”); 42 (discussing the controversies over
whether the Assembly could specify that certain bills would last
for three years).
97
Id. at 96.
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ports that were hostile to the Parliament.”98 In January of 1645,
armed with the letter of marque, Ingle returned to Maryland,
essaying to foment a more general Protestant resistance against the
colonial government and, ultimate, to capture Governor Calvert
and return him to England to be tried.99 His missive to the
Maryland Protestants seems to have been enthusiastically received,
and it is likely that Ingle’s interventions did not only result in his
capture of the ship “Looking Glass” and the pillaging of various
areas in Maryland but even allowed for the establishment of a
temporary Protestant government.100 Although sparked by the
intervention of an outsider, Ingle’s rebellion depended for the
destruction it wrought—resulting in the dissolution of Maryland’s
government for some time—on the participation of a number of
colonists themselves.
Ingle did not receive the welcome reception in England that
he had anticipated; instead, the High Court of Admiralty refused to
ratify his seizure of “Looking Glass” and another victim of his
plundering, Thomas Cornwalyes, pursued a separate action against
him under common law.101 Governor Calvert, who had fled to
England during the rebellion, made plans to return to Maryland,
and proffered a pardon to smooth the path to his 1646 return.102
Why, then, was an Act of Oblivion still necessary in 1650?
It may not be possible to determine a single reason, but the
circumstances leading up to the law render several explanations
plausible. First, the uprising had been accompanied by significant
amounts of plunder and disruptions in property rights. A
legislative act might help to address some of the uncertainties
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Id. at 262 (“As part of his preparations, Calvert sent a pardon to
the inhabitants of St. Mary’s, stating that if they would submit to
Lord Baltimore’s authority their former crime of rebellion would
be forgiven.”); Proceedings and Acts of the General Assembly (29
Dec. 1646), in 1 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND 209 (“Testified that the
Gouert afore their comeing upp out of Virgina declared to all the
Souldiers in publicke and to these deponents in particulr in these
words or to this effect that they weare to attend hym upon these
terms, viz: that if he found the Inhabitants of St Maries had
accepted his pardon for thier former rebellion and weare in
obedience to his Lorp the Souldiers weare to expect no pillage
there but he would receave the inhabitants in peace . . . .”).
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about ownership and liability arising from Ingle’s rebellion.103 The
language of the statute, addressing contractual obligations and their
validity, supports this interpretation of why it was necessary.
Second, the assent of the assembly added legitimacy to the earlier
pardon, a reconfirmation that may have been rendered particularly
important by Leonard Calvert’s intervening death.
As a
subsequent petition explained, the “[s]everall pardons by the
former Governors Leo: Calvert Esq, mr Thomas Greene and . . .
my Lord Baltemore then Proprietary of this Province” were
“confirmed by an act of Assembly and an Act of oblivion to remitt
all offences . . . .”104 Third, granting a general legislative oblivion
carried with it the additional benefit of being able to explicitly
except Ingle himself as well as some compatriots from the benefit
of the pardon. Finally, the oblivion could insist upon forgetting
rather than simply forgiving.
The language of the statute explained the joint efforts of the
Lord Proprietary and the Assembly and, strikingly, covered first
civil and then criminal actions. After initially specifying that “ther
shall bee an utter Abolition of all actions tending to recover
damages for any faulte committed against any one in his
Lordship’s peace by any of the party who were in Rebellion
against his Lordship’s Government here,” the act proceeded to
declare unenforceable all contracts made with any party in
rebellion against the government and barred any suits to recover
compensation for property or labor used in furtherance of the
colony’s defense. Only then did the law indicate that all
inhabitants—with some designated exceptions—would “bee
absolutely and freely pardoned of all offences whatsoever Capitall
or other” committed during the relevant period. Oblivion’s
capacity to address and remove the financial obligations attendant
upon civil crisis emerges particularly prominently from the order
in which the statute treats contracts and crimes. Even more
important than indemnification from punishment appears the
103

Governor Calvert had already attempted to address some of
these property disputes, but the persistence of a suit by
Cornwalleys against John Sturman in 1651 suggests that neither
his actions nor the oblivion itself had entirely eliminated such
controversies. As Riordan notes, “Calvert had pardoned the rebels
for their actions, but he was unwilling to let them keep their spoils.
The rebels agreed to return any stolen goods they still had in their
possession or to pay triple damages. Some of the plundered estates
may have been recovered in this fashion, but there is no way to be
certain.” Riordan, supra note 94, at 271. See also The Humble
Peticon of John Sturman, 3 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND 633 (1651).
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capacity of the legislature and Lord Proprietary together to wipe
away any monetary complications produced by the rebellion.
The law differs in another respect from what would become
the standard English structure of oblivion; those violating the
proscription against remembering or speaking about the underlying
events were subjected to corporal punishment rather than simply
fines. Whereas English oblivions generally provided for damages
against those raising the specter of prior revolutionary scenes,
Maryland mandated that:
[F]or the better preserving of peace and unity it is allsoe
enacted by the Authority and with the Consent aforesaide
that all revileing speeches practices or Attempts tending to
the disturbance of the Amity desired, and intended, and
namely all revileing or upbraiding of other with matter of
plunder Rebellion or any other Odious or reproachfull
tearmes for any matter or thing pardoned by his Lordship or
abolished by vertue of this Act bee utterly forborne and
layd aside upon payne of imprisonment during pleasure
Fine banishment Stocks Pillory whipping any one or more
of these . . . .105
The rather fulsome enumeration in this passage of means by which
forgetting could be undermined suggests the assembly’s efforts to
ensure that no one circumvent the spirit of its act. Lest the litany
itself fail to deter anyone, the prospects of indefinite detention,
exile, and physical torment should have had the desired effect. Not
itself forgotten like some of its English analogues, this oblivion
itself remained in force and was rendered part of the colony’s
permanent laws in 1676.
Although oblivions were not enacted indiscriminately
within the colonies, legislative records demonstrate a number of
instances where civil unrest or rebellion found closure in oblivion
or oblivions ratified the inauguration of a new form of government.
In Maryland itself, the Proprietors were overthrown by protestants
at the time of the Glorious Revolution in England. When a new
royal governor was installed, it was “[v]oted that an Act of
oblivion be drawne up.”106 In Connecticut, where pardoning was
given by the charter of 1662 to the general assembly,107 this body
105

Act of Oblivion, P.R.O. Colonial Entry Book No. 53 (April
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13 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND 370 (May 17, 1692) (Proceedings
and Acts of the General Assembly, April 1684-June 1692).
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determined in 1665 that “all former actings that have past by the
former power at New Haven, so farr as they have concerned this
Colony (whilst they stood as a distinct Colony,) though they in
their own nature have seemed uncomfortable to us, yet they are
hereby buryed in perpetuall oblivion, never to be called to
account.”108 This oblivion, although tersely described, carried with
it consequences. When a subsequent lawsuit came before the
general court, it “voated and by vote declared that the business that
Mr. Brian Rosseter prosecuted against Mr. Leet in May Court, and
in July last, and Mr. Leet’s appeale to this Court about it, is
included in the act of oblivion and Mr. Leet by that act
indemnified.”109 Similarly, after William Penn was installed in
Pennsylvania, “An Act of Oblivion was read thrice and confirmed”
in the legislature.110 This oblivion was legislatively enacted
despite the power of pardoning that had been given to Penn by the
charter of 1681.111
If oblivions were fortunately not required frequently during
much of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the situation
altered rather drastically leading up to the American Revolution
and in its aftermath. An exchange in 1774 between the royal
government in England and the representatives of North Carolina
demonstrates a war waged in the terms of oblivion. Recognizing
the power of forgetting, King George III himself then offered
oblivion to those of the colonists who would agree to put down
arms. Finally, the Continental Congress encouraged the states to
pass oblivions to settle disputes arising out of the recent conflict
and a number of legislatures responded compliantly.
In the period leading up to 1771, some North Carolinians
had become increasingly disaffected with the methods of tax
revoke, annul, release, or pardon under their Common Seal, as by
the said General Assembly, or the major Part of them shall be
thought fit”).
108
PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT 440 (“At a
Generall Assembly held at Hartford, Aprill 20th, 1665”).
109
PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT 25 (“At a
General Session Held at Hartford, October 12, 1665”).
110
PENNSYLVANIA ARCHIVES, ser. 8, vol. 1, at 36 (“Votes of
Assembly,” 1683).
111
1681 CHARTER OF PENNSYLVANIA (“[W]ee doe likewise give
and grant unto the said William Penn . . . to remits, release, pardon
and abolish whether before Judgement or after all Crimes and
Offences whatsoever comitted within the said Countrey against the
said Lawes, Treason and willful and malitious Murder onely
excepted, and in those Cases to grant Reprieves, until Our pleasure
may bee known therein . . . .”).
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collection implemented by the colonial government and perceived
the local officials charged with enforcing colonial policy as
corrupt. Their general resistance, known as the “Regulator War,”
culminated in the 1771 Battle of Alamance, sometimes considered
the first moment of the American Revolution. Following this
event, an act of indemnity was passed, phrased in extremely
general terms. As the record of the assembly from December 16,
1771 read, “[a] Bill to indemnify such persons as have acted in
defence of Government, and for the preservation of the public
peace of this Province during the late insurrection from vexatious
suits and prosecutions” was “[r]ead the third time and passed.”112
The purpose of this indemnity was to settle some of the financial
woes and debts arising out of the Regulator War that might also
have been addressed by an oblivion. At the same time, discussions
about the possibility of an act of oblivion itself commenced.
These deliberations evinced a delicate interplay between
Crown and colony, King George seemingly retaining complete
authority over pardoning while encouraging the North Carolina
legislature to actually implement an oblivion. As American
Secretary Hillsborough wrote to the governor of North Carolina in
1772, giving and taking away with the same hand:
[I] have the satisfaction to acquaint you that the King
approves of what you propose upon that subject and has
commanded me to signify to you his Majesty’s pleasure
that you do recommend to the other Branches of the
Legislature to concur with you in passing an act of pardon
and Oblivion conformable thereto with such exceptions as
shall be thought reasonable and proper, but you are not to
give your assent to it without a clause being inserted therein
suspending its execution until his Majesty’s Pleasure be
known.113
Although Governor Martin promptly encouraged the North
Carolina Assembly to pass an act of oblivion, controversies
between the two houses about who would be excepted from its
purview plagued the law and prevented its passage.114 Again the
following year, at Martin’s continued insistence, the Council and
112
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9 COLONIAL AND STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 377
(Minutes of the Upper House General Assembly) (Martin’s address
to the assembly), 381 (the assembly’s positive response), 433
(rejection of the oblivion on the third reading because of the
deletion of several names by the lower house) (Jan. 25, 1773March 6, 1773).
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Lower House considered on several occasions “A Bill of pardon
and oblivion to the persons concerned in the late insurrection
except such persons as are therein excepted,” again failing to
approve of the text on the final reading.115
Within that same 1774 session, the earlier act of indemnity
returned as a provocation for further controversy with England.
While the oblivion remained pending, the Lord Commissioners of
Trade and Plantations reproved the colonial legislature for the
broad terms of its prior indemnity, insisting that the language must
be revised lest the entire law be disallowed—the mechanism for
abrogating colonial statutes.116 Undaunted, the legislature’s upper
house responded to Governor Martin with at least feigned surprise,
noting that the language of their own law was patterned after
similar statutes:
[W]e have taken under consideration the act of Indemnity .
. . and finding that it is copied almost word for word from
British Acts of Parliament upon similar occasions
extending no benefit, protection or indemnity to His
Majesty’s Subjects, who stood up in support of his
Government in this Country, but such as have been
extended to his Subjects of Great Britain, receive with
surprise the information that the Lords Commissioners of
Trade and Plantations, think an explanatory Act at all
necessary. We are persuaded however, that if that Honble
Board would but compare the Act of Indemnity with the
Act of Parliament after which it was modeled, they would
not continue to think themselves under the necessity of
laying a Law to which their observations refer, before the
King, for his Royal disallowance.117
If the Lords remained unimpressed with the similarity, the address
continued with perhaps some irony, the assembly retained faith
that the King himself would not treat his colonial subjects
differently from his English ones and would therefore let the
indemnity stand.118
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(March 7, 1774, read the first time and passed); id. at 846 (March
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9 COLONIAL AND STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 877-78
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The sallies back and forth between colony and royal
representatives over both indemnity and oblivion show the intricate
political dynamics of penalty remission at the commencement of
the American Revolution. Whereas English officials worried that
indemnification would excessively advantage the colonists, and
perhaps not entirely those of whom England itself approved, the
King retained an investment in the sovereign display of mercy,
which he attempted to exercise through the offer of oblivion. The
actual practice of the colonial legislature, however, thwarted his
efforts. Because the act of oblivion had to be passed by the
assembly, the terms of the law and its exceptions could be
subjected to debate just as would the language of any other statute.
Despite the King’s efforts, the colony could reject even oblivion if
that oblivion failed to comply with its sense of the situation.
Furthermore, the similarity between Parliamentary responses to
civil war or rebellion in England and the North Carolina’s act of
indemnity could furnish a weapon for the assembly to deploy
against any claim of inconsistency or repugnancy between colonial
legislation and the laws of England. Although colonial acts of
oblivion and similar laws had developed within America since
1650, the resemblance of these laws to English practice should
serve to justify them within the colonial context. Precisely through
echoing England’s approach to oblivions, the North Carolina
assembly thereby laid claim to its political autonomy.
With the full onslaught of revolution, King George III’s
efforts at offering oblivion continued,119 but it was not until the
period of the Second Continental Congress that the dynamics of
negotiation between a more general national authority and colonial
or state efforts again became evident. Like the British King with
the colonies, the Continental Congress attempted to persuade the
states to adopt oblivions. The Continental Congress was more
successful than the British King, however, at their task. Most
notably, at the behest of the Continental Congress, an oblivion was
proffered not simply towards those who were fighting or had
fought on the wrong side in the Revolution but rather to those
involved in more local boundary disputes.
Within these
discussions, however, a change was becoming evident, as the
rhetoric of pardoning was increasingly conjoined with that of
oblivion and recourse to the latter became more limited. Indeed, at
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one point, an initial proposal recommending oblivion for those
adhering to the British was reduced into a rather circumscribed
pardon.
Already in 1778, the Continental Congress encouraged
state action—whether legislative or executive—to ensure pardons
of those purportedly misled into joining the British forces,
encouraging citizens themselves to forget the underlying offences.
According to the minutes of the meeting, it was
Resolved, That it be recommended to the legislatures of the
several states to pass laws, or to the executive authority of
each State, if invested with sufficient power, to issue
proclamations, offering pardon, with such exceptions and
under such limitations and restrictions as the several states
shall think expedient, to such of their inhabitants or
subjects, who have levied war against any of these states . .
. : and it is recommended to the good and faithful citizens
of these states to receive such returning penitents with
compassion and mercy, and to forgive and bury in oblivion
their past failings and transgressions.”120
Five hundred copies of this resolution in English and two hundred
in German—along with the reasons for it—were ordered printed
and disseminated.
When a committed reported back to the Continental
Congress in June of 1782 recommending that the states “pass acts
of pardon and oblivion in favor of such persons and description of
offenders, who have heretofore joined or adhered to the armies of
the King of Great Britain, under such restrictions, provisos,
conditions and limitations as to the Legislature of the respective
States may seem meet and advancive of the Peace, Safety and
Interests of these United States,”121 however, the proposal was not
immediately accepted and the measure was instead recommitted.
The result was considerably less expansive, simply advising state
legislatures that disloyal citizens might be encouraged to rejoin
American forces through a pardon and that they should therefore
“take into consideration the propriety of offering pardon to such
non-commissioned officers and privates who have been refugees
from these States and are now in the Corps of the Enemy.”122
Oblivion was, however, more readily offered for conflicts
between the states themselves. Attempting to deal with the
120
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ongoing dispute about the existence and delineation of Vermont
from New York and New Hampshire, the Continental Congress
instructed the latter states, also in 1782 to “pass acts of indemnity
and oblivion, in favour of all such persons as have at any time
previous to the passing such acts, acted under the authority of
Vermont so called, in any manner whatsoever upon such persons
submitting to the jurisdiction of the said States respectively: and
provided always, that the said States of New York and New
Hampshire, respectively, do pass acts confirming and establishing
the titles of all persons whatever, to such lands as they do now
actually occupy and possess within the limits of the district
aforesaid . . . .”123 New York quickly followed suit, and a few
months later its “Act for Pardoning Certain Offences Committed in
the North-Eastern Parts of this State” was reported to the
Continental Congress, accompanied by a law detailing the
disposition of disputed property, entitled “An Act for Quieting the
Minds of the Inhabitants in the North-Eastern Parts of this
State.”124 The language of the Act specifically alluded to the fact
that those pardoned had “implored the clemency of government,
and humbly entreated the passing of an act of indemnity, oblivion
and pardon.”125 Notably, however, the statute specified that no one
could avail himself of the pardon who was accused of treason on
account of loyalty to the British government.126 Even within this
New York pardon, resistance to a more general oblivion that would
cover the events of the Revolutionary War remained.
Another example of oblivion from the period, in North
Carolina, also concerned a controversy about the boundaries of a
state’s territory. The counties of Washington, Sullivan, and
Greene essayed to set themselves up independently as the State of
Franklin. As North Carolina resisted this continuing effort, one of
its strategies for reintegrating the individuals involved in the effort
for independence was to issue and re-issue oblivions to those
involved. After an initial oblivion was passed in 1782, the
question of whether to extend, amend or repeal it arose on a
number of occasions throughout the following years, through
1789.127 By its terms, the oblivion “restored . . . the said persons . .
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. to all privileges of the other citizens of the State as if the said
offences and misconduct had never existed.”128 The act differed,
however, from many similar statutes in that it failed to suggest a
definitive resolution of property disputes in favor of one side or
another and instead indicated that injustice in the disposition of
property should be rectified by resort to the courts of common
law.129 The structure of oblivion was already changing, yet the act
remained legislatively enacted and emphasized the renewed
citizenship of those included in its terms.
While the minimalist notes from the sessions of the
Continental Congress and the records from the various states
indicate only general sentiments about the necessity for local acts
of oblivion, a tract pseudonymously penned by Aedanus Burke as
“Cassius” renders the political theory and the sense of historical
precedents propelling this trend more perspicuous.130 Burke, a
lawyer and immigrant from Ireland, was serving in the South
Carolina House of Representatives as well as on the South
Carolina Supreme Court when An Address to the Freemen of South
Carolina was published in Philadelphia in 1783.131 In the Address,
Burke lambasts General Rutledge for extending an offer of pardon
and oblivion to British loyalists that would last only during the
limited period of thirty days.132 Burke also excoriates the
legislature for passing acts of exclusion, confiscation and
amercement, thereby depriving disloyal South Carolinians not only
of the capacity to serve in the assembly but even the ability to even
vote for their legislators while simultaneously divesting them of
property. The only solution, he posits, would be an “act of
amnesty or oblivion.”
As Burke reiterates several times, South Carolina’s method
of responding to the Revolution represents the most extreme form
of injustice, that of disguising revenge under the trappings of law.
By passing acts designed to retaliate against those who had failed
to fight alongside the revolutionaries, those in control of state
government had made revenge look lawful. Rather than allowing
the war to reach a graceful end, such legislation instead tends to
foment further dissention:
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For if after a civil war, and one party vanquished,
persecution was to go on; if the fury of laws and the fierce
rage of passions prevailed, while the minds of men were
yet fired by deadly revenge against their fallen adversaries;
this would be worse than keeping up the war: it would be
carrying on hostility under the shape of justice, which is the
most oppressive, and of all other injustice, excites the
greatest detestation, and the most violent factions and
division.133
Warning fellow South Carolinians about the judgment history
would render upon them for adopting a merciless stance and
rendering it part of the law itself, Burke likewise insists that, “To
strike a blow of vengeance under the mask of justice, is the most to
be execrated of all iniquity; and the historian who joins to a clear
head, a good heart, never fails to deter posterity from such deeds
by painting them in proper colours.”134 Lest the inherent injustice
of their activities not be rendered evident by Burke’s own treatise,
he advises that the patterns of history suggest the egregiousness of
South Carolina’s approach and that it will be so perceived in
hindsight.
A particular and rather Hobbes theory of the state lies
beneath Burke’s assumption that divesting individuals of the rights
of citizenship and property because of failure to aid the
revolutionary cause represents revenge rather than justice.
Although Burke also cites Pufendorf and others, he touts Hobbes’s
special relevance because “he lived in England in the time of the
grand rebellion, when England then was, as Carolina was lately,
distracted by a fierce war, and were persecuting each other, as the
parliament forces, or those of the king got the better.”135 From
Hobbes and other thinkers, Burke derives the idea that, when the
state fails in its obligation to protect the subject or citizen, natural
law and the law of nations allow the latter to justifiably submit to a
conquering force.136 As Burke claims:
In this situation necessity, whose dominion triumphs over
all human laws pointed out to our inhabitants, that as there
was neither government, laws, nor army to protect them,
they were at liberty to protect themselves, as well as they
133
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could. This is the law of Nature and of Nations: And all
Statesmen, the best lawyers, and most eminent writers,
agree, that when an invader over-runs a country, defeats the
standing forces, and subverts its government, the
inhabitants of such a country are justifiable to take the
conqueror’s protection and obey his laws; and whether the
government be a monarchy or republick, it makes no
difference, as the reason of the thing is the same.137
Because adherence to British rule was authorized by the
circumstances, those who chose that approach could not justifiably
be punished for their actions.
Instead, they retained the rights of citizenship that they had
previously possessed, even if those rights had lain dormant during
the period of the Revolution. Burke expressed the desire “to shew,
that on the restoration of the republic and law from British
thralldom, the protection-men [i.e., those who sought protection
under the British crown] who had been our citizens before, were as
fully entitled to all the rights and freedom of citizenship, as those
who were detained prisoners of war, or took refuge to the
northward.”138 His argument for this conclusion depends on the
precepts of natural law, the law of nations, and the domestic law of
South Carolina. As Burke asserts, “The laws of nations as well as
the rights of nature therefore dictate, that when a country
oppressed by a foreign power regains its liberty, the citizens should
be restored to all the rights and liberties they before enjoyed.”139
Critiquing the Exclusion Act, which prevented those who had not
conformed to the terms of Rutledge’s offer of pardon from serving
in the legislature or electing members, he further insists that the
fundamental laws of South Carolina bolster these individuals’
rights:
This Act of Assembly supposes with the Governor, that all
who did not come in within the time specified by the
proclamation, and serve six months, had forfeited their
liberty, and that such as obeyed, were restored to lost
freedom. But the gentlemen of both Houses forgot, that the
citizens of South-Carolina had to thank the Governor for
nothing: Their rights and liberties were founded on
something else besides parchment, or paper, or a
proclamation; they were build on the laws of nature, and
the fundamental laws of the State, and they were supported
by the valour, and cemented by the blood of those brave
men who fought, bled, and died in the cause of freedom,
137
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not for the usurpation of a few, but for the liberties and
happiness of all.140
Governing only in favor of those who were loyal to the American
cause would, under this account, violate the very principle of “we
the people,” allowing a particular faction to retain its ascendancy
rather than providing for the well-being of every American citizen.
Among the many problems that Burke identifies in
Rutledge’s proclamation is the way in which it reaffirmed the
governor’s own power by offering individual pardons that would
have to be solicited rather than proffering a more general oblivion.
He writes of the proclamation that it requires “what perhaps was
more mortifying; they must humble themselves and supplicate for
mercy as criminals, at the feet of a man who a little before was a
fellow citizen, no more than on a footing with themselves.”141 By
insisting on supplication for mercy, Rutledge placed himself in a
position of absolute rather than contingent power over other South
Carolinians and thereby rendered himself tyrannical.
In Burke’s concluding argument for an Act of Oblivion, the
peace of the republic, restoration of citizenship and return of
property loom large. As authority for the grant of amnesty, Burke
casts as far back as ancient history, citing episodes from Greece
and Rome. The pre-eminent example or precedent to which he
turns, however, is that of the Act of Oblivion passed immediately
on King Charles II’s restoration to the English throne. He links the
contemporary situation in America quite clearly to the moment of
the Restoration in England: “[T]o make the matter still clearer, I
shall draw a comparison between the conduct of the British nation,
on the restoration, after the grand rebellion, and of our legislature
on the re-establishment of our republic in 1782.”142 The paradigm
provided by Charles II, who eschewed revenge in favor of peace,
becomes the one to emulate. As Burke writes,
When the troubles were over, and Charles the Second was
restored to the throne, he had his own injuries and the ruin
of his friends, to avenge. But did he avenge those injuries?
Did he dismiss his first parliament, as we did the last
assembly, leaving the terrors of law hanging over the
people’s heads; and resolve to send the court of sessions
through the country, to fill it with condemnations and
convicts, to the disgrace and utter distress of families, and
add to the list of widows and orphans? He did nothing of
all this. The very first bill he passed was an act of amnesty,
to settle the distractions of the nation. Had he reasoned like
140
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our politicians, he would have fallen upon confiscation,
banishment and amercement; and under pretence of
preventing a future rebellion, he would like us, have passed
acts to exclude from votes or seats in the legislature, such
as were deemed enemies to royalty. Instead of such like
measures, which would have only increased the nation’s
misfortunes, he passed a general amnesty; out of which
forty nine of the late king’s judges were excepted. These
had a fair and public trial, and of the whole, ten only were
executed. This was all the blood shed after so furious a
civil war.143
At the moment of the American Revolution, the very origins of
oblivion in England with the English Revolution are recalled, and
the justifications for the 1660 Act of Oblivion rehearsed. Despite
the fact that the parliamentary oblivion under King Charles II
accompanied a restoration of monarchy rather than a new form of
republican government, the paradigm of amnesty that it established
could be applied in America.
Acts of oblivion thus proliferated in colonial America and
were even reaffirmed by the Second Continental Congress. As did
many aspects of colonial common law bearing a family
resemblance to English forms, these acts differed in certain
respects from their analogues across the Atlantic. Under them,
property was not always restored to those pardoned but was instead
disposed of in disparate ways, and harsher punishments were
sometimes prescribed for violating their terms. Nevertheless, and
strikingly in the context of the explicit grants of pardoning power
to governors and proprietors, oblivions remained legislatively
enacted.
V

PRAGMATICS OF PARDONING

Because the common law contexts of pardoning and
amnesty are not determinative as to the distinction between the two
and their respective locations within the branches of government,
normative arguments drawn from both the historical record and
contemporary debate may assist in deciding where the powers
should lie constitutionally.144 The strongest claims for presidential
control over amnesty derive from a conception of amnesty as
emergency power aptly articulated by Alexander Hamilton in
Federalist 74 and the lack of an explicit amnesty clause in Article I
143
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granting the capacity to Congress. By contrast, the generality of
amnesty and its ability to erase the memory of prior conduct,
including perhaps immunizing executive branch officers from
prosecution, suggests its suitability for legislative rather than
executive action. Furthermore, many of the entailments of
amnesty—including the restoration of confiscated funds or the
return of individuals to full citizenship—call upon congressional
powers over spending or naturalization.
While far from determinative in the context of U.S.
constitutional law, the practice of several European countries, such
as Germany and France, in constitutionally separating pardon from
amnesty and the justifications that have been adduced for doing so
illuminate some of the reasons for differentiating the two
conceptually and allocating the former to an executive and the
latter to a legislative branch. With the French Revolution, the
legislative assembly assumed the capacity to grant amnesty.145
This new location of the amnesty power was hardly
uncontroversial, however, and only on the advent of the Third
Republic in 1871 was the legislature finally accepted as the
appropriate branch. Under the Constitution of 1958, Article 34
specifies that statutes must prescribe an amnesty.146 Largely
influenced by the French model, the German Weimar Constitution
of 1919 similarly separated out pardoning from amnesty in its
Article 49.147 As that provision indicated, “The President exercises
the right of pardon [das Begnadigugnsrecht] for the Reich. Reich
amnesties [Reichsamnestien] require a Reich statute.”148
The normative rationales adduced for maintaining a
legislative amnesty in France were two-fold, relying partly on the
discrepancy between amnesty and pardoning and partly on the
notion that amnesty constitutes a political act that must be fully
subscribed to by the representatives of the people. On the first
point, one writer claimed in 1848 that:
Pardon [la grâce] intervenes only when justice has
accomplished its mission, when the law is satisfied, when
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all the interests are safe; it dispenses with punishment, but
by the same token it confirms the sentence; it is associated
with the judicial power so that that power’s work may be
completed in mitigating punishments that would be too
harsh. Amnesty does not wait for judgment, but opposes it;
amnesty stamps out the injunction of the law, prevents it
from acting, suspends the function of the judge, suspends
the execution of the laws.
How can amnesty be
comprehended by pardon? How can it be derived from
pardon?149
Whereas pardoning interacts with an established judicial process,
amnesty thwarts the operations of that very system. Furthermore,
the greater participation of the public in the process of legislative
deliberation suggests the suitability of allocating a decision on
amnesty to a national assembly than a sole executive officer. As
French jurist Joseph Barthélemy wrote in L’Amnistie, “Amnesty is
an act of high politics. . . . Amnesty is an essentially national act,
an act of national reconciliation; it must therefore come from the
organ which is supposed to receive the most directly the will of the
citizens.”150 Despite articulating this argument for a legislative
power of amnesty, even Barthélemy advocated a collaboration
with the executive, suggesting that the government propose and the
assembly then grant the amnesty. Although this recommendation
was not adopted, a hybrid form has indeed developed, under which
a law may delegate power to the executive to issue an amnesty.151
Although pardoning has been invoked surprisingly little by
those debating the scope of executive power following the events
of September 11, 2001, Alexander Hamilton’s defense of a plenary
presidential power in this area resonates with much recent
reasoning about states of emergency. According to Hamilton,
[T]he principal argument for reposing the power of
pardoning in this case in the Chief Magistrate is this—In
seasons of insurrection or rebellion, there are often critical
moments, when a well timed offer of pardon to the
insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquility of the
commonwealth; and which, if suffered to pass unimproved,
it may never be possible afterwards to recall. The dilatory
process of convening the Legislature, or one of its
branches, for the purpose of obtaining its sanction to the
measure, would frequently be the occasion of letting slip
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the golden opportunity. The loss of a week, a day, an hour,
may sometimes be fatal.152
For Hamilton, the relative speed of President and Congress, with
the former poised to act quickly to avert disaster while the latter
lingers over details, supported a broad presidential pardon, and, in
particular, something that sounded very much like amnesty.
Responses to this rationale have been developed in recent years in
relation to other posited emergency powers. Many have, for
instance, adduced the rapid passage of the USA Patriot Act as an
example of Congress’s capacity to address emergency situations as
promptly as the President. Nevertheless, claims about timing and
rapidity continue to be raised in aid of arguments for presidential
emergency powers.
Additionally, supporters of presidential power over
amnesty as well as pardon can cite to the contrast between Article
I, which never mentions amnesty, and Article II, which explicitly
states that the President may pardon. Despite the absence of any
mention of amnesty in Article I, however, the Supreme Court itself
acknowledged that a concurrent congressional power could still
persist. In Brown v. Walker (1896), the Court upheld a challenged
congressional act that secured witnesses immunity from
prosecution, stating that it was “virtually an act of general amnesty,
and belong[ed] to a class of legislation which is not uncommon
either in England [] or in this country.”153 As the opinion further
affirmed, “[a]lthough the constitution vests in the president ‘power
to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United
States, except in cases of impeachment,’ this power has never been
held to take from congress the power to pass acts of general
amnesty, and is ordinarily exercised only in cases of individuals
after conviction . . . .”154 In the case in question, the amnesty was
authorized as an incident to Congress’s commerce power.
The rhetoric of amnesty in many circumstances also
involves restoring individuals to full citizenship. When Congress
considered whether to pass legislation granting amnesty to those
who had avoided the draft during the Vietnam War, a number of
comments referred to the expatriation of large groups of people
and the desire to return the privileges of citizenship to them.155

152

FEDERALIST PAPERS 74 (Alexander Hamilton).
161 U.S. 591, 601 (1896).
154
Id.
155
Record of hearings on the subject of the appropriate treatment
of those who had refused to be drafted during the Vietnam War or
who had otherwise avoided or left military service without
authorization can be found in H.R. Subcomm. on Cts., Civ.
153

Draft: Please Do Not Cite or Circulate Without Permission

48

Congress’s Article I power over naturalization would undergird its
efforts to restore the capacities of those whose involvement in
war—or, in the case of Vietnam, failure to become involved in
war—might call into question their continued capacity as citizens.
Furthermore, when the return of confiscated property is involved,
at least when such property has already vested in the Treasury,
Congress must pass legislation to fully implement the amnesty. As
Justice Douglas’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer contended in another type of posited emergency, President
Truman’s constitutional capacity to seize the steel mills was
contingent on congressional action to raise revenues and ensure
just compensation for the taking.156 One could similarly argue that
the President’s ability to grant amnesty, when it entails a financial
component, is dependent on Congress’s authorizing act. Finally, to
the extent that amnesty occurs in conjunction with the resolution of
foreign as well as domestic conflicts and the conclusion of a peace
treaty, the Senate’s role in confirming such agreements suggests
that at least one branch of Congress should be involved.
A further pragmatic question might sway interpretation in
favor of finding a congressional capacity to issue amnesty and
limiting the President’s power in this area. Given the fact that the
English King lacked the abilities that advocates of a strong pardon
power contend the President possesses, should we endorse an
interpretation of the president’s capacity that would render him
more potent than George III?
VI

CONCLUSION

Remembering oblivion and its distinctions from pardoning
furnishes new possibilities for U.S. approaches to transitional
justice within the international arena as well as methods for
treating civil unrest at home. Although the speech protections of
the First Amendment—not to mention the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause—would hardly permit a statute such as
Maryland’s 1650 Act of Oblivion to be passed today, other aspects
of oblivion could be resuscitated. In particular, Congress could
take up its capacity to enact amnesty in a broader set of
circumstances than is currently acknowledged, and the connection
between amnesty and the settling of property rights and restoration
of citizenship could be reinvigorated. More fundamentally, the
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value in certain circumstances of a general forgetting rather than an
individual forgiving might return to public consciousness.
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